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RIGHT OF A CITY TO PAY ITS CITY MANAGER OVER
THE SUM STIPULATED IN SECTION 246 OF THE
KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION TO BE
PAID PUBLIC OFFICERS.*
FAYETTE CmcurIT COURT
CLIFTON L. THOmPSON

Vs.

-

-

-

-

-

-

Plaintiff

OPINION OF THE COURT

CITY OF LEXINGTON, a corporation,

W. T. CONGLETON, Mayor of the City of Lexington,
DAvm ADES, SAM MCCORMICK,
CHARLES R. THOMPSON and STvE FEATHERSTON,
Commissioners of the City of Lexington, and
PAur, MORTON, City Manager of City of Lexington

Defendants

The City of Lexington is classified as a city of the second
class among the municipal corporations of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, and as such has been operated and governed since
1913 under the commission form of Government Act (Chapter
50, Act of 1910), and previous acts not ih conflict therewith.
On November 4, 1930, an election was held in the City of Lexington pursuant to the provisions of Section 3235dd-18, at which
election a majority of the voters recorded themselves in favor of
and accepted the provisions of the city manager form of government (Acts 1930, Chap. 91, p. 310) which form of government
went into operation on January 4th, 1932, and since said date
said city has been and is now operating under said city manager
form of government.
On the date last above mentioned the defendants, W. T.
Congleton, David Ades, Sam McCormick, Charles R. Thompson,
and Steve B. Featherston assumed the duties of Mayor and Commissioners respectively, and since said date have been and are
now performing the duties of said offices.
* This Is one of a series of opinions of circuit judges and federal
district judges on questions of law, many of which have not been
passed upon by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. This opinion is by
Judge King Swope of the Fayette Circuit Court, Lexington, Kentucky.
It has been affirmed in 250 Ky. 96 (1934).
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After the qualification of the said Mayor and four Commissioners on January 4th, 1932, they duly organized as the
Board of Commissioners of the City of Lexington, and in their
first session the said Board of Commissioners enacted the following ordinance:
"ORDINANCE NO. 2.
"An ordinance appointing and employing Paul Morton as City Manager and fixing his salary.
"Be it Ordained by the Board of Commissioners of the City of Lexington:
"Section 1. That Paul Morton be and he hereby is appointed and
employed as City Manager of the City of Lexington, Kentucky, at a
salary of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars per year.
"Section 2. That, whereas, It is necessary that the City Hall at
once have employees necessary to carry on its affairs, public safety requires that this ordinance shall take immediate effect, and an
emergency is hereby declared to exist and this ordinance shall take
effect immediately upon its passage and approval.
Passed Board of Commissioners Jan. 4, 1932.
W. T. CoGLOTOx, Mayor.
Attest: R. L. Castillo,
City Clerk."

Said ordinanve was duly recorded Jan. 4th, 1932, and was
on January 5th, 1932, published in full in the official newspapers of the city of Lexington. On January 4th, 1932, the
aforesaid Paul Morton accepted the appointment as City Manager and executed bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars
and entered upon the discharge of his duties, and since said

date has been and is now performing the duties of such position.

On January 22nd, 1932, the, plaintiff, Clifton L. Thompson,
instituted this action as a citizen and taxpayer on his own behalf and that of all other citizens and taxpayers similarly sit-

uated.
In

his petition plaintiff asserts that the appointment and

determination of compensation of the defendant Morton, 'were
made under and pursuant to Sections 3235dd-32 and 3235dd-33
of Kentucky Statutes, which are as follows:
Section 3235dd-32. City Manager; selection; interference with, a
misdemeanor.--Under the city mahager form of government the board
of commissioners shall select and employ a city manager who shall not
be an officer or official of the city, but the executive agent of the mayor
and board of commissioners In the management of city affairs. Neither
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the mayor nor board of commissioners nor any commissioner shall dictate the appointment of any person to office or employment by the city
manager or in any manner interfere with the city manager or prevent
him from exercising his own judgment in the appointment of officers
and enployees in the administrative service. Except for. the
purpose of inquiry the board of commissioners and its members
shall deal with the administrative service solely through the city manager and neither the board of commissioners nor any member thereof
shall give orders to any of the subordinates of the city manager, either
publicly or privately. Any such dictation, prevention, orders, or other
interference on the part of the mayor or a member of the board of
commissioners with the administration of the city shall be deemed to
be a misdemeanor and upon conviction of any member so convicted
shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding sixty days, 'or both, and such
conviction shall operate to remove him, and the judgment of the court
shall declare the office vacant. (1930, c. 91, p. 17.)
Section 3235dd-33. City Manager; qualifications; term; removal;
compensation.-The city manager shall be chosen by the bJoard of commissioners solely on the basis of his executive and administrative
qualifications. The choice shall not be limited to the city or state. He
shall bd employed for an indefinite period. He shall be removable at
will by the board of cofimissioners, but such removal shall not be
effected by a reduction in the compensation of the city manager, and
if removed at any time after having served six months he may in
writing demand written charges and a public hearing on the same
before the board of commissioners prior to the date on which his final
removal shall take effect, but during which hearing the board of commissioners may suspend him from office. Such public hearing shall
be fixed by the board of commissioners not to exceed thirty days after
such demand therefor. During the absence of disability of the city
manager the board of commissioners shall designate some properly
qualified person to perform the dutiei of the office. Such city manager
shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the board
of commissioners. (1930, c. 91, p. 18.)

Plaintiff avers that Section 3235dd-32 of Kentucky Statutes,
insofar as it undertakes to provide that the city manager selected by the Board of Commissioners shall not be an officer, or official of a city of the second class, is void and of no effe.t. He
alleges that the city manager is an officer within the meaning
and interpretation of Section 246 of th.e Constitution of the.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, which said Section 246 of the Constitution limits the salary of all public officers except the governor to the sum of five thousand dollars per year for official
services. And that the action of the Board of Commissioners in

employing the defendant, Morton, at an annual salary of $10,000.00 is in violation of Section 246 of the Constitution, and is
invalid to the extent that it provides for the payment of more
than $5,000 per year to said Morton. He also points out that
Section 162 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Ken-
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tucky provides that: "No county, city, town, or other municipality shall ever be authorized or permitted to pay any claim
created against it, under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law, and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void". That Section
8235dd-33 of the Kentucky Statutes, as above quoted, wherein
it provides that the Board of Commissioners may fix the compensation of the city manager in such sum as may be determined by it is indefinite and uncertain, and does not by express authority or law or otherwise, empower the Board of Commissioners of a city of the second class to obligate the city for
any sum in excess of $5,000.00 per year, for services of a city
manager; and that said ordinance No. 2, above quoted, to the
extent it fixes such compensation in excess of $5,000.00 is null
and void and in violation of the above quoted Section 162 of the
Constitution of Kentucky.
Plaintiff then prays on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated for a writ of prohibition enjoining the city,
the mayor, the commissioners, the mayor and commissioners acting as the Board of Commissioners, and Morton, from proceeding to carry into effect Ordinance No. 2 employing Morton so
far as it attempts to authorize his salary at $10,000.00, and from
paying him, in their official capacity, any sum in excess of the
Constitutional limit of $5,000.00 per year.
He also prays that Sections 3235dd-32 and 3235dd-33 of
Kentucky Statutes and Ordinance No. 2 to the extent that they
permit payment to a city manager of a city of the second class
,or any sum in excess of $5,000.00 per year, be declared uncon'stitutional, and in violation of Sections 246 and 162 of the
'Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
On November 5th, 1932, E. Q. McGlone, a taxpayer, tendered an Intervening Petition herein which in paragraph one
'thereof contained substantially the same allegations as those
,contained in plaintiff's petition. In the second paragraph of
2McGlone's intervening petition he sought to recover of the
-mayor and commissioners all in excess of $5,000.00 per annum
p-aid to Morton. By an agreed order of the parties the second
paragraph of the Intervening Petition as tendered was stricken
-from the record on November 12th, 1932, and said Intervening
Petition with the second paragraph thereof thus stricken was
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filed and noted, and said McGlone and Clifton L. Thompson
were denoted parties plaintiff in this action.
On December 17th, 1932, by an agreed order plaintiffs
waived heir motions for immediate writ of prohibition and the
cause was submitted to the Court on defendant's demurrer to
plaintiff's petitions.
It being a well settled principle of pleading in this state
that the demurrer admits the truth of all facts well pleaded and
every allowable and proper deduction therefrom, we will now
look to the petition and ascertain if it states a cause of action.
The petition as above stated sets forth Section 246 of the
,Constitution of the State of Kentucky, which provides in part,
"'no public official except the Governor shall receive more than
$5,000.00 per annum as compensation for his official services,
independent of the compensation of legally authorized deputies
and assistants, which shall be fixed and approved by law .......
Plaintiff contends that said constitutional provision has been
violated by paying Morton in excess of $5,000.00 per annum.
Counsel for the city contends that the above provision of the
Constitution does not apply to municipal officers in the first
place, and in the second place, even though the said provision
applies to municipal officers the said Morton is not a public officer within the meaning of that provision. This whole case,
therefore, hinges on two questions, above mentioned: Does Section 246 of the Constitution apply to municipal officers, and if
so is the city manager a public officer within the meaning of
that provision?
The city contends that the above section of the Constitution
is limited in its application, and that it applies only to state
and county officials. It further contends that adjudicated cases
do not apply said section to city officers, and that the use of the
words, "state, county, town and municipal officers" in Section
161 of the Constitution, and the mention of "city and town
officers in Section 167 of the Constitution indicates that if the
limitation of Section 246 had been meant to apply to city officers, the framers of the constitution would have expressly mentioned them. The use of the words "city, county, town, or municipal officers" in Section 161, supra, and "city and town officers" in Section 167, supra, was a necessity, as in these instances the said constitutional provision applied only to the
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named officers to the exclusion of the state officers. Moreover,
several general constitutional provisions, such as Section 228,
have consistently been held applicable to both city and state.
officers. However, all doubt on this question has been removed
by the Court of Appeals in the comparatively recent case of
CarroU v. Fu/derton, 215 Ky. 558; 286 S. W. 847; in which the
Court of Appeals in passing on the salary of the prosecuting
attorney for the city of Ashland, Kentucky, which at that time.
was a city of the third class, said:
"On December 4, 1923, Fullerton filed his petition in the Boyd
Circuit Court against the city by which he sought to recover from it
the balance of the thirty per cent commission of fines and forfeitures
collected and turned into the city treasury over and above $5,000 per
year, which latter amount the city had paid, but disputed his right to
recover from it more than the $5,000, although the excess was a part.
of the thirty per cent, upon the ground that Section 246 of the Constitution limited his salary to an amount not exceeding $5,000, and
that the fees and commissions of his office above that should be turned
into the city treasury. The Boyd Circuit Court, upon the trial of the.
case, in which was involved only that legal question, erroneously held.
that plaintiff was not such a public officer as the section of the Constitution referred to, and that, since there was no statutory limitation
of plaintiff's salary, he was entitled to recover the amount sued for,
and judgment was rendered in his favor."

The Court of Appeals having declared that the prosecuting
attorney for a municipal corporation of the third class, was.
within the limitation of Section 246 of the Constitution, this
court is of the opinion and so holds, that Section 246 of the
Constitution applies to municipal officers of the City of Lexington.
Having held that Section 246 of the Constitution applies to.
city officers, the question now arises as to whether or not the
city manager is such an officer. The city maintains that the
Legislature in enacting Section 3235dd-32 of the Kentucky
Statutes, providing for a city manager, "who shall not be an
officer, or an official of the city, but the-executive agent of the
mayor and board of commissioners in the management of the.
city affairs," removed the said manager from within the provisions of the said Section 246 of the Constitution, and made
the same absolutely inapplicable to the said city manager. To
this argument the plaintiff replies that Section 3235dd-33 and
Section 3235dd-32 of the Statutes are inconsistent; that Section.
3235dd-32 says that the Board of Commissioners shall select and
employ a city manager who shall not be an officer or officia of
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the city, and that the following section, 3235dd-33, in unmis-.
takable terms designates the position which the city manager
is to occupy as an office, as it provides that the city manager
may be suspended from office after he has served six months ;,
and that some qualified person may be selected to perform the
duties of the office of the city manager during his absence or
disability. There is some merit in the contention that an inconsistency exists, and that inasmuch as Section 3235 dd-33 defines the qualification of the city manager as distinguished from
the method of his selection as set fortbh in Section 3235dd-32,
that Section 3235dd-33 should control insofar as determining.
his position. Nevertheless, this court is of the opinion that the
clear intention of the Legislature was to effect a statute that
the city manager should not be an officer. In this respect the
lack of technical nicety of language does not veil the legislative,
intent to call the city manager an executive agent, and not an,
officer or official of the city.
The defendants ask the questions: What provisions of the
Constitution does the legislative declaration violate? In what
provision of the Constitution is there any restriction upon the
power of the Legislature to provide for any executive agent with
the status of an employee, and not the status of an officer!
In order to answer these questions there must be a prior
consideration as to whether the legislative declaration actually
changes anything, namely, can the Legislature give one the rank,
rights, and duties of an officer, and yet by a change in nomenclature makhe such a person an executive agent. If the Statuteis non-effective in this regard, then a person with the function
of. an officer is an officer, and Section. 246 is applicable regardless
of whatever name the Legislature might choose to call him. The
question, therefore, is one of the effectiveness of the Statute
rather than whether the legislative declaration is violative of
any particular Constitutional provision. In the case of Rouse
v. Johnson, 238 Ky. 473, 28 S. W. (2d) 745, Judge Willis in hisdissenting opinion said:
"The official character of an officer Is to be determined by the
nature of the duties devolved upon him. It is not a matter of terminol..
ogy; names are nothing; titles are without significance in this connection. The constitutional limitation is not concerned with terminology,
or the names or titles annexed to officers. So far as I can find, or has
been suggested, no court ever held that the character of an office can
be determined otherwise than by the duties delegated to It."
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Thus, the Section 3235dd-32 in providing that the city manager shall not be an officer or city official is non-effective, if in
fact the city manager possesses all the qualifications of an officer. It is true that it would be impossible to lay down a definition of an officer that would be applicable to all cases. Many
definitions have been offered by counsel in their able briefs, on
both sides, and to quote from them at length would unduly
prolong this opinion. However, there are certain establisked
elements which unmistakably designate an officer. In the leading case of State Ex ReZ Barney v. Hawkins, 257 Pacific 417,
the Court after an extensive discussion of the distinction between an officer and an employee, set forth the following ele.ments constituting an officer:
"After an exhausive examination of the authorities we hold that 5
elements are indispensable in any position of public employment in
order to make it a public office of a civil nature.
"1. It must be created by the Constitution, or by the Legislature,
or created by a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the Legislature.
"2. It must possess a portion of the sovereign power of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public.
"3. The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must
be defined directly or impliedly through the Legislative authority.
"4. The duties must be performed independently and without
control of a superior power other than the law, unless they be those
,of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the Legislature, and by it placed under the general control or superior office or
body.
"5. It must have some permanency and continuity, and not be
only temporary or occasional. In addition, in this state (Montana)
an officer must take and sign an official oath and give bond, if the
latter be required by proper authority."

Our own Court of Appeals has substantially upheld the
above listed elements in cases too numerqs to mention.
Let us now examine the Act and see how many of these
elements the city manager possesses. A brief survey of the city
manager under the "city manager form of government" Act,
Section 3235dd-16, et seq., shows clearly that the city manager is
the executive agent of the mayor and Board of Commissioners;
he may attend meetings of the Board of Commissioners; the
Board must upon the advice of the city manager create by
ordinances such administrative departments as are necessary;
he is responsible for the proper administration of all of the of-
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fices of the city; he must prepare the budget; he makes all appointments and removals. Interference with the city manager
by any person is made a misdemeanor. He has power to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, and compel the production
of books and papers, which amounts to the granting to him not
only adminstrative and executive power or authority, but well
nigh gives him judicial power.
It is readily seen, therefore, that the city manager possesses
all the qualifications of an officer with the single exception that
he does not take oath. However, it is obvious that the Legislature cannot by simple evasion of nor requiring the city manager
to take oath nullify Section 246 of the Constitution. While the
Act does not require the city manager to take an oath, yet the
same act empowers him to administer oaths to others, compel
the attendance of witnesses, and provides that the Commissioners may require him to execute bond, which the Commissioners
have done. The taking of an oath is not indispensable to an
office. In the case of Morgan v. Vance, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 323,
the Legislature passed an act not requiring the city collector to
take the full oath prescribed by Section 1, Article 8, of the Constitution, which required that all officers take an oath set forth
in the Constitution. The Court held that the person performing the functions of a city collector was an officer, notwithstanding the failure of the Legislature to require the full oath of said
city collector. In other words, the Act creating the office of city
collector, in fact, provided for an office, but the named limitation in regard to the taking of the oath was invalid.
The nature of the duties of the city manager as set forth
above, are strikingly similar to those of the county superintendent of schools as set forth in the Board of Education of
Boyle County v. Mchesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W. (2d) 26. In
this case the County School Superintendent was declared to be
a public officer. Also a public officer was therein defined as a
person vested with some portion of the functions of government
to be exercised for the benefit of the public. The Court said:
"Election to.office usually refers to a vote of the people, whilst appointment relates to the designation of the officer by some individual
group. Speed v. Crawford, 3 Mete. 207; Police Commissioners v. City of
Louisville 3 Bush 597; McKinney v. Barker, 180 Ky. 530, 203 S. W. 303,
L. R. A. 1918E, 581. But is is argued that, the county school superintendent under the present statutes, is not an officer with a fixed term,
and defined duties, but merely an employee of the board of education,
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to serve at its pleasure. Without pausing to consider the difference in
-consequences of the twd relationships (xcf. Hermann v. Lampe, 175 Ky.
109, 194 S. W. 122), we do not hesitate to hold that a county superintendent of schools is an officer, and not an employee. A public officer
'is a person vested with some portion of the functions of government,
to be exercised for the benefit of the public.' Gity of Louisv ie v. Wilson, 99 Ky. 604, 36 S. W. 944, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 427; Fox v. Lantrip, 162
Ky. 178, 172 S. W. 133; Bd. Drainage Commrs. McCracken County v.
TLand, 187 Ky. 123, 218 S. W. 736; 46 C. J. No. 2, p. 922. The county
3chool superintendent is the executive officer and secretary of the board
of Zducation. He must attend all meetings of the board, and of every
committee, except when his own tenure or salary or work is under consideration. Section 4399a-2. He may call special meetings of the board,
and is authorized to advise on all matters concerning the administration of the school and the adoption and enforcement of educational
policies. Section 4399a-4. He has the entire supervision of the schools
of the county, and is the liason officer of the board of education with
the district trustees. He may administer oaths in connection with the
administration of his office (Section 4399a-12); to sign all appropriations (Section 4399a-5); to represent the state superintendent in the
-examination of teachers (Section 4399a-10), and no contract of the
board without his written approval is valid (Section 4399a-10)."

There can be no doubt that the duties which devolve upon
the city manager are functions of governi.,ent which ought to
and, must be exercised for the benefit of the public.
The Attorney General of Kentucky in an opinion rendered
in 1928, found in the 1928 Opinions of the Attorney General,
-page 292, held that the city manager is a public officer. On page
'293 of his opinion he says:
"There has never been any doubt in my mind that a city manager
elected and appointed by said Chapter 84 of the 1920 Acts is a public
officer within the meaning of Section 246 of the Constitution, and is,
therefore, limited to a salary not exceeding $5,000.00 per year. The
General Assembly cannot evade the limitation imposed by Section 246
,of the Constitution by saying in an act that the city manager 'shall
not be an officer or official of the city, but the executive agent of the
-mayor and board of commissioners in the management of the city
affairs." The General Assembly may not provide for the appointment
-of an officer, define his duties and invest him with all the power of a
public officer, and then prevent him from coming within the restrictions imposed by the Constitution upon public officers, that he 'shall
mot be an officer or official.'"

The opinion also quotes Meecham on Public Offices:
"The authority and duty of appointing others to office, of them-selves constitute the person having that authority and duty a public
officer, and it is immaterial that such person is not designated as an
officer and takes and receives no fee."

It is, therefore, clear from all of the above authorities that
the city manager is a public official within the meaning of Sec-
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tion 246 of the Constitution of Kentucky. Section 3235dd-32
of Kentucky, insofar as it undertakes to provide that the city
manager selected by the Board of Commissioners shall not be
an officer or official of the city, is void and of no effect. The
city manager is such an officer within the meaning and interpretation of Section 246 of the Constitution, and Ordinance Xo. 2
of the board of commissioners in employing the defendant,
Morton, at an annual salary of $10,000.00 is a violation of Section 246 of the Constitution, and is invalid to the extent that
it provides for the payment of more than $5,000 per year to
Morton.
The Court, therefore, being of the opinion as above stated,
that Section 246 of the Constitution is applicable to municipal
officers, and also that as such municipal officer Morton is also a
public official within Section 246 of the Constitution, it thereby
follows that the petition states a cause of action and it becomes
unnecessary to discuss other questions presented in the briefs
of counsel of respective parties.
The provisions of the above section of the Constitution limiting salaries of public officials, with the exception of the governor,
to $5,000.00 a year, are plain, precise, unambiguous, and alt
inclusive. Constitutions import the utmost discrimination and
use of language, and we are now speaking of the most solemn
of human writings which 'ordain the fundamental laws of the
state, and it is very plain to this court that the framers of the
Constitution intended exactly what that provision says. The
Constitution was adopted by the people of the state as the fundamental law of the Commonwealth, and its every mandate is
paramount authority to all persons holding official trusts in
every department of government and to the sovereign people
themselves.
This provision is binding on all the Courts of this Commonwealth, and it is the sworn duty of this Court to uphold the
Constitution with respect to limitations of salaries. Certain
criticism has been directed at this section of the Constitution in
years past, but if the people are dissatisfied with it, they have
the right in their hands to alter it in a constitutional manner.
Experience has taught us, however, over a long period of years
that this provision limiting salaries is a wise, conservative and
economical mandate, and it must be observed.
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Counsel will prepare an order overruling the demurrer in
conformity with this opinion, allowing each of the defendants
exceptions, and, in the event the defendants decline to plead
further judgment may be drawn for the plaintiff, allowing defendants an appeal to the Court of Appeals if they desire to,
facilitate a ruling on the questions herein by the Court of Ap-peals; and the Clerk will make this opinion a part of the record.
Kn4G SWOPE, Judge.

